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New Social Media and Politics in Thailand: The Emergence 
of Fascist Vigilante Groups on Facebook
Wolfram Schaffar
► Schaffar, W. (2016). New social media and politics in Thailand: The emergence of fascist vigilante groups 
on Facebook. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 9(2), 215-234. 
Since 2010, Facebook has become a battleground between competing political camps in 
Thailand. Facebook groups like the Social Sanction group, tellingly abbreviated as SS, 
and the Rubbish Collector Organization, which was founded in 2014 and has attracted 
more than 200,000 members, have played a crucial role in the process of political radi-
calization. The aim of these groups is to expose political opponents by accusing them 
of lèse-majesté, which can result in a prison sentence of 15 years or more. The groups 
also serve as fora for hate speech and are increasingly used as a tool of mobilization for 
state-sponsored mass events by the authoritarian regime that came to power with the 
coup d’état of May 2014. Contrary to its popular perception as a tool for democratization, 
Facebook has been successfully used by political groups reminiscent of fascist vigilante 
groups. This paper analyses the genesis of these groups and discusses the phenomenon in 
a broader political and historical context.
Keywords: Facebook; Fascism; Rubbish Collector Organization; Thailand; Vigilante Groups

INTRODUCTION
In May 2015, a Red Shirt activist who identifies herself on Facebook as Tana-
nun Buranasiri was targeted by a Facebook mob. During the campaign against 
her she was accused of having posted comments that were disrespectful of the 
monarchy and was threatened with accusations of lèse-majesté under Article 
112 of the Thai Criminal Code – a charge that can result in a prison sentence of 
15 years. The Facebook mob even disclosed personal information about Tana-
nun and her family, including the name of the shopping mall where she worked. 
When people started appearing in front of the particular shop, she was fired by 
her employer (“Red Shirt Sacked”, 2015). 
The campaign against Tananun Buranasiri was organized by a Facebook 
group called the Rubbish Collector Organization (RCO), which had more 
than 200,000 members in summer 2015. Judging by the daily number of likes 
and comments, the group was highly active between April 2014, when it was 
launched, and late 2015, when its founder, Rienthong Nanna, officially withdrew 
from it. The stated aim of the RCO was to “clean” Thailand of “social rubbish” 
– people, according to their definition, who were not loyal to the monarchy or 
who opposed the military coup d’état of May 2014 (“Doctor Sick of All”, 2014). 
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The RCO has published lists of people who were subsequently targeted by both 
online as well as offline mob campaigns, such as the one against Tananun Buranasiri. 
The post about Buranasiri’s dismissal alone drew more than 4,480 likes by August 
2015, and followers of the group posted numerous comments insulting her and ex-
changing fantasies about how to “get rid” of her.
The most serious incident that has been connected with such a campaign is the 
shooting of Kamol Duangphasuk, a well known writer and poet who took the side of 
the Red Shirts in his work. Although it has never been solved, Kamol’s assassination 
coincided suspiciously with the founding of the RCO, which had launched one of its 
first campaigns against him and whose members applauded his assassination (Hu-
man Rights Watch, 2014). 
Apart from bullying individuals, RCO’s Facebook group also served as a forum in 
which members publicly displayed their loyalty to the monarchy by means of, for ex-
ample, photos of public performances of the royal anthem or joining public events in 
honor of the King or Queen. Iconic examples include the campaigns “Bike for Mom” 
and “Bike for Dad”, through which the heir to the throne, who meanwhile has become 
King himself, called on Thai citizens to join a biking tour around the city to express 
their loyalty and gratitude on the occasions of the Queen’s and the King’s birthdays. 
Mobilizing for and documenting mass events like this was the second major func-
tion of the RCO Facebook group. The peculiar mixture of violence against political 
opponents and mass mobilization is reminiscent of political processes and strategies 
typical of the ascent of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe. In those times, 
ultra-nationalist vigilante groups mobilized to intimidate left-wing political oppo-
nents and create political chaos, with the ultimate aim of abolishing parliamentarian 
regimes. Mass events then mobilized popular support for authoritarian regimes to be 
set up. It was hardly by accident that the predecessor of the RCO on Facebook was a 
group called Social Sanction, abbreviated as SS. 
Figure 1. Screenshot, taken from the timeline of RCO Facebook group, May 2015,  
showing the campaign against Tananun Buranasiri. In English: If no complaint has yet been filed 
against Tananun Buransiri, I and my team will do so beginning of next week. I beg you to be patient. Be 
sensible. General Rienthong Nanna, 10 May 2015. (figure by the author).
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The establishment and success of the RCO is a disturbing example of how social 
media is being used in contemporary Thailand in times of deepening political con-
flict. Contrary to its popular perception as a tool for democratization, Facebook has 
been successfully used by political groups in a way reminiscent of fascist vigilante 
groups. The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the genesis of social-media 
based vigilante groups as a first case study. The problem, however, seems to have a 
wider significance which goes beyond the scope of this paper, but will be touched 
upon in the final remarks.
FACEBOOK
Facebook was founded in 2004 as a social networking platform at Harvard Univer-
sity, based on the university’s printed yearbooks or “facebooks” (Marichal, 2012, p. 3). 
After expanding to other US universities and colleges in 2005, it was opened to the 
broader public in 2006 and experienced explosive growth in the following years. By 
July 2010, Facebook had amassed 500 million users (Marichal, 2012, p. 4) and sur-
passed one billion in the third quarter of 2012. Facebook has kept growing, due es-
pecially to its expansion into new geographic areas and sectors of society. Between 
2013 and 2016, the biggest growth rates in terms of Monthly Active Users (MAUs) 
was achieved not in the US and Canada or Europe, but in the Asia-Pacific region and 
in what Facebook statistics refer to as the “Rest of the World” (Constine, 2016). By 
April 2016, Facebook counted over 1.65 billion MAUs, which means that the network 
enjoyed a steady growth rate of 15% per year (Zephoria, 2016). In 2015, social media 
had become the most important driver of all website referral traffic (DeMers, 2015), 
accounting for more than 31%. Facebook had a share of 25% and has left behind all 
major competitors (DeMers, 2015), including blogs, Google+, and also networks rely-
ing on mobile Internet, such as WhatsApp or Instagram. 
Facebook, as the biggest social network site, has at the time of writing, effective-
ly become a synonym for the Internet as such. The enormous growth of Facebook 
has attracted many researchers and there has been steep growth in social science 
research into the phenomenon (Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). Despite the high 
output of scientific papers, however, it is safe to say that Facebook is still an under-
researched phenomenon. This is due to the fact that the company does not disclose 
its data, unlike Twitter, for example, that gives all tweets to the Library of Congress 
and has thus attracted a huge number of researchers. Due to its personal character 
as well as the company’s business interests, Facebook data are not public and are 
difficult to extract. Other factors complicate empirical research further. Facebook is 
continuously developing its technical applications, which often leads to fundamental 
changes. The site also keeps changing its privacy policy, which makes it difficult even 
for the user to keep track of which content is visible to whom. Hence why empirical 
social science research has to rely on conventional methods of data collection. The 
study presented here relies on an analysis of screenshots of postings found in the 
RCO Facebook group in summer 2015. In order to access the postings, the author and 
a research assistant registered as members of the group. In addition to this, single in-
formal interviews were conducted via the chat application of Facebook with selected 
group members. However, the motivation for and an important background to this 
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study are interviews and informal talks with Thai friends and colleagues who were 
threatened or targeted by violent attacks connected with Facebook.
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF FACEBOOK
That the Internet has triggered tremendous changes in social interaction worldwide 
is a commonplace observation. When the uprising in the Arab world in 2011 was 
dubbed a ‘Facebook Revolution’, the moniker expressed that even pivotal political 
developments may be traced back to the impact of specific communication technolo-
gies. 
This utopist-decisionist view of the Internet can most adequately be described as 
a technical modernization theory: Due to a technical innovation, entire societies un-
dergo fundamental change in spheres including social relations, forms of production, 
and political regimes. The expectation is that the Internet creates a new public sphere 
(Castells, 2008) where, due to the technical specification of the new communication 
channels, citizens can meet on more equal terms, civil society can organize better, 
and deliberation can be more inclusive and more effective. 
Many expectations regarding the spread of the Internet have not come to pass. 
Singapore is an example where the government has supported 100% broadband In-
ternet access in the city but has at the same time kept the authoritarian regime in 
power. George (2007) and Lee (2010), drawing on the Foucauldian concept of govern-
mentality, have analyzed how the government of Singapore used the technical speci-
fications of blogs, tailored legislation, and calibrated coercion to trigger self-censor-
ship and even broaden the surveillance of their population. With its successful policy 
of containment, Singapore has served as a laboratory for the design of authoritarian 
governance techniques that have subsequently been adopted and adapted by other 
governments, most prominently in China and Thailand. Moreover, it has been shown 
that existing inequalities concerning gender, race, and class are often reproduced and 
even enhanced on the Internet. The same holds true for global inequalities (Chang, 
Himelboim, & Dong, 2009; Graham, De Sabbata, & Zook, 2015). 
Some scholars hoped that the spread of social media and social networking ser-
vices would finally fulfill the promise of the Internet, which had not been realized by 
classic Internet applications. In contrast to the old model of setting-up and main-
taining static homepages, Facebook allows for a truly reciprocal exchange of data 
and opinions. The classic gap between sender and receiver is absent, and sharing has 
become the keyword for data exchange and Facebook (Van Dijk, 2013). Moreover, 
early versions of Facebook which allowed users to change names and maintain sev-
eral profiles made it possible to practice anonymity and fluid identities. On this basis, 
scholars saw in it the advent of a true network society (Castells, 2008; Shirky, 2009).
Many analyses of Facebook have, however, pointed in another direction. In con-
trast to the utopist-decisionist view, and as a reaction to the disillusionment with 
empirical evidence, some analyses have posed their focus less on technical solutions 
and more on the ‘technology in use’. These constructivist approaches stress that tech-
nical applications are embedded in and shaped by social and political processes. The 
amount of information available on the Internet, for example, seems to exceed the 
capacity of Internet users to process it – to discern its quality, reflect on it, or use it for 
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meaningful deliberation (Marichal, 2012, p. 19). Rather than using the abundance of 
shared high-quality information, users are distracted by Twitter posts and Facebook 
status updates. As early as 2010, a Pew report found that young people’s use of the 
Internet showed a tendency to move away from content-sharing sites like YouTube 
and blogs and toward sites focused on social networking (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & 
Zickuhr, 2010). 
In addition to this cloud of banality, the Internet and social media in general 
display a tendency toward fragmentation. Instead of making use of the possibility 
of exchanging views with people from all strands of life, users are linking up with 
those they already know or with whom they agree politically. Quantitative research 
into political blogs has shown that the exchange of opinions among bloggers largely 
remains within homogeneous groups. References to blogs expressing rival opinions 
are far less common than references to blogs that express the same opinion. The 
blogosphere thus mirrors the political divides within society. Moreover, in referring 
to pieces that express the same opinions, these groupings function as echo chambers, 
radicalizing the positions and arguably exacerbating political polarization (Adamic & 
Glance, 2005; Lawrence, Sides, & Farell, 2010; Sunstein, 2004, 2009). This tendency, 
also known as selectivity bias, is also evident in Facebook networks (boyd, 2010). As for 
the situation in Thailand, the tendency of Facebook groups to act as echo chambers, 
whereby people exchange and discuss their views with those of a similar opinion, is 
clearly borne out (Grömping, 2014).
Another critical question is how far Facebook supports or furthers political en-
gagement. Indeed, analyses have shown that Facebook users are more politically ac-
tive than average (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2010; Kahne, Middaugh, & 
Allen, 2014). A closer look into what kind of political activity is supported by Face-
book reveals that, like other Internet-based platforms, it leads not to engagement 
in the sense of a physical presence, but to what Morozov (2011) and Gladwell (2010) 
respectively termed slacktivism. Online activism – so it seems – substitutes low-cost, 
low-benefit political behavior for meaningful political engagement (Gladwell, 2010; 
Marichal, 2012; Morozov, 2011).
Another dilemma facing social science research into the political effects of Face-
book appears with respect to right-wing or fascist groups. With the rise of right-wing 
and fascist groups in many different countries, research has been conducted into how 
these groups use the Internet (Caiani & Kröll, 2015; Caiani & Parenti, 2013; Froio & 
Gattinara, 2015; Tateo, 2005). It has been shown that right-wing groups are making 
good use of the opportunities offered by Internet-based communication – circum-
venting national legislation banning fascist activities and using the Internet for in-
group organization as well as outreach. Whereas the possibilities of the Internet are 
perceived as positive opportunities when used by democratic social movements in 
authoritarian contexts (Etling, Faris, & Palfrey, 2010; Laer & Aelst, 2010), the same 
features appear dangerous when it comes to fascist mobilization.
POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN THAILAND 
The current political divide between the Red and Yellow camps in Thailand started 
as an intra-elite conflict when Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister in 2001 
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(Kasian, 2016; Montesano, Pavin, & Aekapol, 2012; Pasuk & Baker, 2008, 2009; Pavin, 
2014). The two factions that confront each other can be characterized as follows: On 
the one side are the Red Shirts – a coalition of party followers and business partners 
of Thaksin. The grassroots followers are mainly lower middle-class people and politi-
cized farmers from the North and Northeast who have profited from Thaksin’s infra-
structure and social security programs (Walker, 2012). A growing group of supporters 
are also drawn from social movements for democracy, consisting of newly politicized 
citizens opposed to the involvement of the military in politics and the unconstitu-
tional maneuvers through which the Yellow Shirts and their parliamentary arm, the 
Democrat Party, monopolize power (McCargo & Naruemon, 2011; Montesano et al., 
2012). On the other side are the old Bangkok elites – also a broad coalition of social 
forces that have been dubbed Yellow Shirts: royalist conservative circles and business 
people connected to the Crown Property Bureau, with exclusive access to the judi-
ciary and military and supported by Bangkok’s upper middle class (Pye & Schaffar, 
2008). The most important ideological focus for this group is a growing nationalism 
that puts the nation, the monarchy, and religion at its center and demands unwaver-
ing loyalty. The appeal to these principles, moreover, to a higher morality based on 
these principles, legitimizes their claim to political leadership. The numeric majority 
of the Red Shirts, however, is explained by populism, vote-buying, and corruption 
(Kasian, 2016; Thongchai, 2008, 2016). 
The general trend, which has become more pronounced over the course of the 
years, was that the Red Shirts managed to win a vast majority in every free election 
with great ease. The Yellow Shirts, claiming that the electoral majority had been won 
through vote-buying or populism, challenged the government and managed to oust 
it by means of their privileged access to the judiciary and military (Pavin, 2014). This 
led to a stalemate between the two antagonistic camps – a constellation of power 
which was also typical of the situation in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, at the advent 
of fascist regimes.
FASCISM IN THAILAND 
It is difficult to use the term fascism as an analytic concept. The notion is strongly 
associated with a specific period in European history between the 1920s and 1940s, 
when ultra-nationalistic parties in Italy took over the government and transformed 
the entire society (Bosworth, 2009). 
The term fascism is derived from a term for Italian vigilante groups – Fasci Italiani 
di Combattimento (FIC) – that were supported by capitalists in northern Italy, with 
the aim of fighting the increasing influence of organized labor and communist groups 
in factories and among rural laborers. Under Mussolini’s leadership, these vigilante 
groups grew strong enough to abolish the parliamentarian system and establish an 
authoritarian regime based on violence. Whether there is any central ideology behind 
fascism that can be defined like other political ideologies such as liberalism or social-
ism is contested. Roger Griffin (2003) argues that “generic fascism” can be pinned 
down by a single formula: Fascism is a “political ideology whose mythic core in its 
various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism”1. Among 
1 Palingenetic means the idea of ‘national rebirth’.
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historians, however, this definition is met with considerable skepticism. Regimes in 
the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s varied considerably in their ideological orienta-
tions and, furthermore, many historians reject the idea of abstracting from histori-
cal cases to create an analytically meaningful concept of fascism. It is doubtful that 
such a concept can be translated to cases outside Europe and to different historical 
periods. 
For Thailand, however, Griffin’s concept seems to fit strikingly. During the course 
of the increasing antagonism between the Red and Yellow Shirts, the latter have fo-
cused their ideology increasingly on nationalistic concepts. In the present context, 
their morally charged appeal regarding nation, monarchy, and religion plays an in-
creasingly central role. A fuzzy, morally charged code of ‘Thai-ness’ is posited as an 
antidote to the perceived decline of society. This Thai-ness serves as point of refer-
ence for the rebirth of the Thai nation, which is pressed on all sides by globalization, 
capitalism, and modernization (Thongchai, 2016). 
Even more illuminating for an analysis of the current political situation in Thai-
land is the strand of research on fascism that focuses on the role of vigilante groups. 
Not only in Italy but in most other European countries vigilante groups were instru-
mental to the rise of fascism. In Austria, for example, there was the Heimwehr – di-
verse groups and remnants of the imperial army in rural areas, supported by clerical-
conservative elites and acting to counter the successful organization of the social 
democrats, communists, and organized labor (Tálos, 2013). Instead of focusing on 
ideology, Bonapartist theories of fascism put class constellations and the role of vigi-
lante groups at the center of analysis (Saage, 2007). At the time of the rise of fascism, 
various European countries’ political landscapes were characterized by a stalemate 
between two antagonistic blocks. On one side were socialist parties and organized 
workers who successfully used the young parliamentarian system to gain influence, 
but were unable to take political power completely. On the other side, conservative 
capitalist elites were entrenched in political institutions and held on to power. In this 
stalemate, and under the specter of a world economic crisis, the middle classes/bour-
geoisie sided with monarchic-conservative elites (Borworth, 2009; Tálos, 2013). Vigi-
lante groups were employed to intimidate organized labor and create chaos, thereby 
legitimizing the dissolution of the parliamentarian system and the establishment of 
an authoritarian regime. The bourgeois sectors of society thus opted to give up their 
political and democratic rights in order to keep their socially and economically privi-
leged position. 
Vigilante groups in Thailand working in the above-mentioned ways are not a new 
phenomenon. Paramilitary groups founded and supported by conservative and right-
wing forces in Thailand have a long history going back to the times of when Thailand 
played a crucial role in the geopolitical strategy of the USA to contain communism in 
Southeast Asia. As a bulwark against a spill-over of communist movements in Indo-
china, Thai authorities spread a strictly anti-communist propaganda and fought the 
Thai Communist Party, which retreated to waging a guerrilla war in the Northeast. 
Accompanying the Four Cuts anti-insurgency policy, the Royal Thai Army’s Internal 
Security Operations Command (ISOC) founded scouting and paramilitary groups as 
a rural defense against communism and all kinds of opposition forces. Village Scouts 
and Red Gaurs played an infamous role in a 1976 massacre when the military staged a 
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coup d’état closing the brief window of democracy which opened in 1973. The groups 
were brought to the capital and were instrumental to the atrocities carried out in 
downtown Bangkok, eradicating all resistance and intimidating any opposition 
(“Steady Rise of Fascism”, 2014; Zimmerman, 1978).
FASCIST GROUPS IN THAILAND ON FACEBOOK
The emergence of vigilante groups on the Internet has grown out of specific historic 
circumstances: political developments and a deepening political divide; legal provi-
sions in Thailand; and the rise of Facebook as the dominant social network.
Following the coup d’état of 2006, the military government began to introduce 
new mechanisms of Internet censorship. The military junta proclaimed a state of 
emergency and the institution of martial law, with the stated aim of uprooting ‘politi-
cal undercurrents’ – a euphemism for the strong support for Thaksin in many parts 
of the country. Because of the self-censorship of the traditional media, anti-coup 
groups had to resort to Internet-based channels to organize. The censorship that was 
put in place to fight these new forms of organization was modeled after Singaporean 
laws and comprises tightened criminal provisions regarding lèse-majesté and new 
Internet-specific laws.
The tightening of Article 112, which punishes lèse-majesté with up to 15 years in 
prison, has made it into a catch-all to intimidate whomever is deemed a political en-
emy. A steep increase in cases shows that this section has been used almost arbitrarily 
to fight political opponents. Until 2005, there were about five cases of lèse-majesté 
per year. In 2007, however, military and royal conservatives started using the law sys-
tematically to silence political opponents. The number of cases exploded, with 478 in 
the year 2010 alone. The law was also considerably broadened in the course of politi-
cal struggle. Originally, it was interpreted as covering the reigning King, but in 2013 
a court ruling found a person guilty of defaming past kings, even those from distant 
history, as well as the pet dog of the King (“Thai Man Faces Jail”, 2015). Sentences 
have also been continuously increased. In August 2015, Pongsak Sriboonpeng was 
sentenced by the Bangkok Military Court to 60 years – later reduced to 30 years – in 
jail for six alleged lèse-majesté Facebook postings (“Man Jailed for 30 Years”, 2015). 
In 2007, the Computer Crime Act was enacted by the military government. A 
censorship authority was created within the Ministry of the Interior which issues 
frequent bans against single websites. During the government of Prime Minister Ab-
hisit, no less than 45,357 sites were blocked, 39,115 of which on the grounds of lèse-
majesté (Saksith, 2014). After continuous criticism from various human rights and 
other political organizations, the number of lèse-majesté cases, as well as the circum-
stances of the accusations, alerted even the United Nations Security Council and led 
to criticism in the Universal Periodic Review process (Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
In addition to criminalizing a number of computer-specific acts, the law intro-
duced the stipulation that the Internet provider or owner of a website is liable for any 
content, including hyperlinks, comments, blogs, etc. With these provisions, and by 
means of applying the tightened Article 112 to Internet fora, the military government 
managed to close down or impose tight controls over most websites where political 
discussions were organized. Popular pages like Midnight University or Prachatai were 
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either shut down or, following the Singaporean model, targeted by spectacular court 
cases in which the providers or editors were held responsible for content allegedly 
insulting the monarchy. This functions as a means of creating insecurity or a ‘chilling 
effect’, triggering far-reaching self-censorship by the common user.
However, the Computer Crime Act only served this political purpose in the short 
term. Its limitations became clear when more and more videos and clips insulting 
the King appeared on YouTube as a means of protest. The government tried to hold 
YouTube responsible yet, after banning the site for some months, it reached an agree-
ment with Google (the owner of YouTube) and the filter was lifted. Today, YouTube 
is flooded with dissident material about the monarchy. Facebook too has become an 
arena where individuals have been able to found groups and create fora that are out 
of the reach of authorities. Recently, the military government has intensified its ef-
forts to trace and prosecute Facebook users (“‘Facebook 8’ Case Shows”, 2016). How-
ever, from 2010 on, social media like Facebook have become the main battlefield of 
political struggle. It was here that the first group showing fascist vigilante features 
appeared: Social Sanction, tellingly abbreviated as SS.
EARLY VIGILANTE GROUPS: SOCIAL SANCTION OR SS
This group was established against the background of the 2010 demonstrations of 
the Red Shirts, who showed a strong and impressive capacity to mobilize. Not only 
their numbers, but also the strength and persistence with which they struggled for 
their demand to hold snap elections, surprised the royalist-conservative government 
of Prime Minister Abhisit and political analysts alike. Using class terminology from 
feudal times to frame their battle as Phrai (commoners/slaves) against Amat (feudal 
lords) drew the question of the monarchy more into focus then at any other previous 
demonstrations (Montesano et al., 2012; Schaffar, 2010).
Already in 2009, there were single incidents of “cyber witch hunts” (Thai Netizen 
Network, 2012, p. 59). The first Internet forum where people were publically accused 
of lèse-majesté was a Facebook group with the title Rally Bangkokians to Oppose Evil 
Red Shirts (Thai Netizen Network, 2012, pp. 63, 77). However, the first group to oper-
ate systematically and with a broader impact was the Facebook group called Social 
Sanction (SS), founded in March 2010 (Thai Netizen Network, 2012, p. 63). The orga-
nizers of the group remained anonymous but declared in their Facebook description 
that their aim was to “unite Thais to expose crooks and defend the monarch by social 
sanction” (Thai Netizen Network, 2012, p. 66). The group operated for three years 
until it finally disappeared in July 2013 (Thai Netizen Network, 2014, p. 136). In the 
course of this time, about 40 people were publicly “exposed” (Thai Netizen Network, 
2014, p. 135). The main activity through which people were targeted were postings, in 
which they were portrayed as disloyal to the monarchy and accused of lèse-majesté. 
If the accused answered to such postings, the campaign went into the next round 
– re-posting screenshots of such reactions with more defamatory comments. The 
main issue was not so much to present legally sound evidence of lèse-majesté, but 
to attack individuals with the more general accusation of being ‘un-Thai’. “Thai-ness 
under absolute monarchy” was the main ideological point of reference, as illustrated 
by postings like: “[W]hoever questions, criticizes or does not express love toward the 
monarch is considered alien, ungrateful, and evil” (Thai Netizens Network, 2014, p. 
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67). Supporters of the exiled Prime Minister Thaksin were insulted with terms com-
mon among Yellow Shirts, like ‘red buffalo’. They were also called ungrateful, ‘traitor’, 
or ‘dead wood’. Comments publicly suggested that they should be lynched. 
In addition to this core activity, the page also served as a forum for exchanging 
political opinions by posting and commenting on news. The exchanges, however, 
followed the same logic as the defamations of individuals and reproduced the dis-
course of “Thai-ness under absolute monarchy” (Thai Netizen Network, 2014, pp. 
67-68). Thus, the SS group can be characterized as a mixture of echo chamber and 
slacktivism. Defaming comments reproduced and amplified a nationalist-royalist 
discourse about Thai-ness. Attacking individuals through Facebook posts and call-
ing, or supporting a call, for action against them was framed as political activism 
or a social sanction. The difference in the forms of slacktivism was, however, that 
the accusation of lèse-majesté, launched by a simple click on the Internet, was and 
is a dangerous weapon and can have serious consequences under Thai legislation. 
The cyber-mobbing led by groups like SS, which used the draconian Article 112 as a 
threat against political opponents, and various counter-campaigns using fake online 
profiles to equally expose opponents to Article 112 prosecution, led to a veritable cy-
ber guerilla war which only eased up with the election of Yingluck Shinawatra and 
the stabilization of politics (Thai Netizens Network, 2014, p. 135). SS was dissolved, 
however, as a consequence of a flawed campaign and public outcry against it: In July 
2012, it launched a campaign against a Lt. Col. Sopa but, lacking a photo, used a pic-
ture found on the Internet. When it became clear that the image was of the wrong 
person, it led to an outrage in the Internet community and SS was closed down (Thai 
Netizens Network, 2014, p. 138).
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND STATE-SUPPORTED VIGILANTE GROUPS:  
CYBER SCOUTS
The process through which a new generation of Facebook-based vigilante groups 
emerged in 2014 cannot be understood without the government’s Cyber Scouts pro-
gram, which was launched in December 2010 by the royalist-conservative govern-
ment of Abhisit Vajjajiva and under the leadership of the Ministry for Information and 
Communication Technology (MICT). In seminars at universities and schools, pupils 
and students were recruited to join a now state-organized group to search the In-
ternet for cases of lèse-majesté and other offences (Farelli, 2010; Rook, 2011). Vol-
unteers could register on a website and, as part of their one-day training, received 
ideological instructions on the history and importance of the monarchy as well as on 
Facebook’s technical specifications. The Scouts’ work included incognito methods 
such as befriending suspects on Facebook and starting conversations about sensi-
tive issues. In the case of a breach of lèse-majesté laws, the Scout would then warn 
the person or hand over the case to the authorities. The name Cyber Scouts clearly 
alludes to the vigilante groups of the 1970s when Village Scouts and Red Gaurs were 
mobilized against the student movement (Farelli, 2010; Saksith, 2010; “Steady Rise 
of Fascism”, 2014). These early programs of state-supported Internet-based spying 
groups were phased out when the government of Yingluck Shinawatra took office in 
2011 but were relaunched after the coup d’état of summer 2014 – this time in an even 
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more comprehensive way and with more financial support from the MICT (Saksith, 
2014). We have not been able to pin down whether people taking part in the Cy-
ber Scout programs have later taken an active role in the Facebook-based vigilante 
groups. Arguably, the program in 2010, however, had a more general effect beyond 
the immediate results of the Cyber Scouts scanning activities. The very existence of 
such a program and the fact that it was initiated by the state administration put ac-
tivities like the ones performed by SS in a different light. Instead of political guerilla 
campaigns, launched by a sectarian group of radical Yellow Shirts, it now appeared as 
state-sponsored, morally valuable political activity serving the nation.
THE RUBBISH COLLECTOR ORGANIZATION 
A new round of mobilization of vigilante groups was launched in late 2013 when Yin-
gluck Shinawatra was prime minister (2011-2014). Despite the fact that Yingluck had 
won the 2011 elections with the support of the Red Shirts, her administration was 
characterized as low profile and reluctant as far as pressing political issues for the Red 
Shirts were concerned. This was often interpreted as a strategy not to create any pre-
text for the Yellow Shirt camp to mobilize against her. Especially with regard to the 
tightened lèse-majesté laws and the legal investigation into the violent crackdown 
against the Red Shirts in 2010, Yingluck remained largely silent. Despite this, the Yel-
low camp started mobilizing for demonstrations in Bangkok to oust the government 
in late 2013. In January 2014, Yellow Shirt demonstrators pushed a campaign with the 
slogan “Shut Down Bangkok – Restart Thailand” and blocked the central traffic hubs 
of downtown Bangkok. Giant screens at the central protest stages and nationwide 
broadcasting via television channels and printed media, which are close to the royal 
conservative camp, were a clear sign of the financial and logistical support of influ-
ential elite circles. On stage, the speakers demanded that elections be abolished and 
the parliament be replaced by an appointed reform committee. This situation – the 
middle-class plus elite mobilization against a popularly supported government, the 
demand for the abolition of the parliamentary system in favor of a corporate system 
of representation, and the legitimization in the name of ultra-nationalist salvation 
of the country – comes very close to the situation in several countries of Europe at 
the advent of fascism, especially Austria in the 1930s and Portugal in the late 1920s 
(Tálos, 2013). In this constellation of power, vigilante groups re-emerged and played 
a crucial role in the political struggle of the Yellow Shirts against the government and 
its supporters, the Red Shirts. They were instrumental in paving the way to the coup 
d’état in May 2014 and the establishment of the authoritarian regime under Prayuth 
Chan-o-cha. 
During the demonstrations, armed security groups who started using violence 
against political opponents were formed around the stages. For example, groups of 
security guards formed motorcycle convoys and started ‘visiting’ government poli-
ticians at their houses amid a climate of rising violence. When Yingluck Shinawa-
tra called for snap elections, these guards attacked citizens who wanted to register 
for voting. On Facebook too, a new vigilante group was established which appeared 
more professional and with a tighter organizational backbone: the Rubbish Collector 
Organization (RCO). 
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From the very beginning, the RCO used a strategy that was considerably different 
from that of the SS. The RCO combined the established forms of guerilla/mobbing 
activism with a professional military organization structure, which was made public 
by a well-designed offline narrative. Moreover, in contrast to SS, which operated as 
a small and anonymous group of radical Yellow activists, the RCO styled itself as 
comprising common people from the streets who had come together due to the spur 
of indignation – a movement rather than a small, radical group. Instrumental to this 
new narrative was the public figure of the group’s founder, Rienthong Nanna, who 
became the face of the group and embodied its specific features.
Rienthong Nanna is 55 years old and runs the family-owned Mongkhut Wattana 
General Hospital in central Bangkok. Before he took over the hospital in 2007, he 
worked in the Army Medical Department and held the rank of a major general. The 
establishment of the RCO was portrayed as Rienthong’s personal initiative. When 
the RCO was launched on Facebook, Rienthong held a meeting in his hospital. The 
meeting, covered by the mainstream media, showcased him and his motivation. A 
central part of the narrative was that Rienthong is non-political, with no connection 
to any parties or political networks (“Call the Stop”, 2014). Despite his lack of interest 
in politics, he had been drawn into that sphere by his indignation over the violence 
he presumed had been committed against Yellow Shirt members. Out of a deeply felt 
sense of injustice, he started joining the Yellow Shirt demonstrations more regularly 
in 2008 and eventually became an ardent supporter who also appeared at the protest 
staged during the 2013/2014 campaign (“Army’s Job to Defend”, 2014).
Rienthong combines the features of a Wutbürger (enraged citizen) with the deter-
mination and ruthlessness of a soldier. At the founding meeting of the group at his 
hospital, 30 former high-ranking army leaders were present (“Monarchists Vote to”, 
2014). Rienthong claimed that he was working on the establishment of a “people’s 
army to protect the monarchy” (“Monarchists Vote to”, 2014), and that the RCO was 
under the special protection of the army, which was promptly denied by army lead-
ers (“Army’s Job to Defend”, 2014). The military structure behind the organization is, 
however, obvious. The group is organized in different units, among which is a “top 
secret surveillance command center” (“Doctor Sick of All”, 2014). The exact structure 
of the group, which served the administrative requirements of its 200,000 members 
and steered online activities, was kept secret (“Doctor Sick of All”, 2014). However, 
our analysis of online communications in July 2015 shows that, despite the large 
number of several hundred comments connected to one post, each comment was 
answered from Rienthong’s personal account – a clear sign that there is a professional 
staff behind this account.
Also in stark contrast to the image of the ‘common man of the streets’ is the mili-
tancy and violence that was apparent in the language of the RCO’s official procla-
mations and Facebook posts. Rienthong defined the aim of the group as to clean 
up Thailand’s “social rubbish” and to “eradicate lèse-majesté offenders completely” 
within two years, where the word eradicate is the same Thai word previously used in 
slogans about “eradicating communism” (“Steady Rise of Fascism”, 2014). Metaphors 
like: “When you first sweep the floor, the dust will be blown all over the place – but 
later the floor will look cleaner” (Rienthong in an interview with the Bangkok Post, 
“Doctor Sick of All”, 2014) resemble a German proverb that was popular in the fascist 
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period and was used to excuse the killing of people as ‘collateral damage’ for the sake 
of reaching a higher end.2 Rienthong also compared himself with Van Helsing (“Doc-
tor Sick of All”, 2014) – the character fighting Dracula in fantasy films. 
Like the SS, as its core activity, the RCO pursued campaigns to expose breaches 
of lèse-majesté, which were then notified to the police. However, the RCO went be-
yond this and systematically combined online and offline activism. As mentioned in 
the introduction to this article, Tananun Buranasiri lost her job when a mob started 
appearing in front of the shop where she worked. Another spectacular case is the 
systematic mobbing of Chatwadee Amorpat, also known as Rose, who works as a hair 
stylist in London and has become known as a Red Shirt activist and critic of the mon-
archy. Rose was named on RCO’s ‘most wanted’ list along with several other promi-
nent dissidents, many of whom are now living in exile. After her private address was 
revealed by the RCO, she was targeted by mobbing attacks in London. Incited by the 
RCO campaigns, Thai tourists as well as Thais living in Europe uploaded video clips 
showing how they had gone to Rose’s house and sprayed slogans on her door or left 
2 “Wo gehobelt wird, fallen Späne”, in English “where there is planing, shavings will fall”, is said to have 
been the favored proverb of Hermann Göring. This only roughly corresponds to the English “You can’t 
make an omelet without breaking eggs”.
Figure 2. Screenshot, taken from the timeline of RCO Facebook group, May 2016,  
illustrating the campaign against Rose. (figure by the author).
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bags of excrement in her mailbox. The mobbing against her went so far that her par-
ents felt pressured to file a case of lèse-majesté against their own daughter (Gazeau, 
2014).
Another example of offline action is the boycott against the Thai UNHCR. The 
impetus for this campaign was the case of Tang Achiwa, also known as Ekapop – a 
Red Shirt activist who was accused of lèse-majesté, managed to flee to Cambodia 
and, with the help of the UNHCR, was granted asylum in New Zealand. The RCO 
published, as a fake cover of a UNHCR report, a selfie showing Tang Achiwa and his 
partner holding new travel documents from New Zealand. Apart form the usual hate 
comments against Tang Achiwa, RCO members boasted of having canceled their do-
nations to the UNHCR and openly threatened the institution: “I'll go and destroy the 
[UNHCR] donation booths and slap the staff. F*** UNHCR Thailand”. After numer-
ous Internet attacks, the Thai UNHCR branch had to shut down its Facebook page 
(“Thai Royalists Condemn”, 2015; “Thai Royalists Threaten”, 2015).
The logic of these campaigns is similar to that of campaigns on the SS page. Cas-
es were set upon the basis of pictures and reports added to the group’s Facebook 
Timeline. This served as a crystallization point for the ordinary group members’ 
Figure 3. Screenshot, taken from the timeline of RCO Facebook group, May 2016,  
illustrating the campaign against the Thai UNHCR. (figure by the author).
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comments, which triggered an echo chamber effect that eventually swelled into hate 
speech. Within this cycle, Rienthong would take the role of a fatherly leader who calls 
for moderation among his followers, albeit without preventing the posting of calls for 
or documentation of violence.
The ritual performance of indignation, followed by hate speech and the docu-
mentation of actions, under the guidance of a fatherly but uncompromising and rig-
orous leader, was increasingly combined with calls for and documentation of mass 
mobilization of members ‘performing’ their loyalty to the monarchy. In this respect 
too, the RCO page constitutes a new development compared to the SS page. Whereas 
older Facebook pages served as fora for the documentation of private initiatives, the 
RCO’s, with its prominent individual members and its mass membership, triggered 
a new effect. State-organized mass events were advertised on RCO, with an almost 
coercive effect on members to, at the very least, click the like button or post greetings 
like the ritual “Long live the King”. One example is the campaigns “Bike for Mom” and 
“Bike for Dad”, which aimed to promote the heir to the throne, Crown Prince Vaji-
ralongkorn, as dutiful son and legitimate successor. For this reason, Vajiralongkorn 
invited Thai citizens to join a public cycling event in Bangkok and other provincial 
capitals on the occasion of his mother, the Queen’s, 83rd birthday. 
Uniformed in merchandise such as light blue t-shirts and flags, the cyclists were 
formed into three groups according to their social and political status and cycled 
along a course. Vajiralongkorn led Block A with the highest representatives of the 
state, including the supreme commander of the Royal Thai Army, the prime min-
ister, and the president of the Supreme Court. Block B, with representatives of the 
private sector, NGOs, and high representatives of the bureaucracy, was headed by 
the Princess Bajrakitiyabha, daughter of the Crown Prince. Commoners cycled in 
Block C. This mobilization, organized along feudal lines representing the corporatist 
order of society favored by the royalist-conservative elites, was covered live on public 
TV channels and on the websites of the mainstream media (“Crown Prince Leads”, 
2015). Apart from various offline channels, participants were also mobilized through 
Facebook groups such as the RCO, where both events constitute the main activity 
since mid-2015.
This event (as well as its subsequent “Bike for Dad” counterpart, which followed 
the same choreography) performed a mass mobilization in corporatist formations 
that strikingly resembled fascist mobilizations in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Back 
then, coerced mobilization served to organize support for authoritarian regimes. In 
Germany, this process slipped into the totalitarian system of National Socialism 
where the distinction between private and public was dissolved in order to exert total 
control over the individual.
CONCLUSION 
In Thailand, we can observe how vigilante groups emerged on Facebook. Ideologi-
cally, these groups come close to Griffin’s (2003) definition of palingenetic populist 
ultra-nationalism, and thus qualify as fascist groups. Their role in a specific constella-
tion of power, as it is analyzed in Bonapartist theories of fascism, is even more strik-
ing. Vigilante groups such as the SS or the RCO perform public witch hunts against 
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people whom they accuse of being disrespectful of the monarchy. The intimidation 
of political opponents and the creation of a climate of fear was instrumental in bring-
ing about a perceived state of emergency, which helped to discredit and abolish the 
parliamentary system in favor of the current corporatist, authoritarian regime. Later, 
after the takeover of the military, groups like the RCO shifted their focus and helped 
to organize mass events where loyalty to the monarchy and the corporatist order of 
society is performed.
The vigilante groups have grown out of specific historic circumstances: the deep-
ening political divide, specific legal provisions in Thailand, and the rise of Facebook 
as the dominant social network site. It has been shown that all these circumstances 
were equally important and equally constitutive for the groups. In this respect, the 
present approach differs from studies cited above where Fascist groups in Italy, Spain, 
or other countries are seen as a phenomenon of offline politics, as groups who – in 
addition to their offline activities – use the communication, organization, and mo-
bilization opportunities of social media. Further studies on similar groups will be 
needed to get a more complete picture of the recent rise of vigilante groups on the 
Internet. A crucial question to ask will be in how far the specific features of Facebook, 
the general trend toward political polarization, and more or less dormant legacies of 
Fascist vigilantism are interlinked.

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